36. Heterogeneous Beliefs

36. 异质信念

有时人们对某资产的基本面价值看法不一。当资产相对较新、以致没有足够信息让任何人正确更新其先验信念时,这一假设最为贴切——现实中,新资产总伴随某种技术创新,如 1990 年代末的 .COM 热(互联网股票泡沫)、2007 年前后的金融创新(房地产市场泡沫)、以及较近的比特币热潮。

本节考察一个主体对资产基本面持异质信念的模型,并以一种不同的方式定义与讨论资产价格泡沫。我们将看到,泡沫的存在实际上源于基于异质信念的投机策略(再售期权,resale option)

36.1 设定

  • 主体索引 \(i\in\mathcal{I}\)(\(\mathcal{I}\) 为全体主体之集)。假设所有主体风险中性,同贴现因子 \(\beta\)。
  • 资产每期有红利,服从一阶马尔可夫过程。记当期红利 \(d\in D\)、下期红利 \(d'\in D\)。从 \(d\) 到 \(d'\) 的真实转移概率 \(\pi(d'|d)\)(从不被观测);主体 \(i\) 的主观转移概率 \(\pi^i(d'|d)\)。

36.2 资产价格与泡沫

资产今日的除息(ex dividend)价值 = 下期红利的折现和 + 持有者可转售资产的下期价格。由于主体对股票基本面(转移概率)看法不一,对股票估值最高的主体最终持有全部资产。这里隐含假设不允许卖空(short-sell),从而全部供给可能被对股票估值最高的主体完全吸收。

  • 由此可定义均衡价格 \(P(d)\) 为当期红利 \(d\) 的函数:

$$ P(d)=\max_i\beta\sum_{d'\in D}\pi^i(d'|d)\big(d'+P(d')\big) \tag{36.0a} $$

  • 类似地,定义 \(q^i(d)\) 为主体 \(i\) 购买并永久持有资产愿付的最高价格:

$$ q^i(d)=\beta\sum_{d'\in D}\pi^i(d'|d)\big(d'+q^i(d')\big) \tag{36.0b} $$

注意 \(q^i(d)\) 是当期红利为 \(d\) 时资产对主体 \(i\) 的基本面除息价值

Important

定义 36.1(泡沫) 存在资产价格泡沫,当且仅当 $$ > P(d)>\max_i q^i(d) > $$

Tip

注记 36.1 定义 36.1 是直观的:若价格超过所有人的基本面估值则称有泡沫。但在租赁市场不完美时,也可能 \(P(d)>\max_i q^i(d)\) 却无泡沫——因不完美租赁市场意味未来折现红利无法逐块完美(等值)地卖给市场,故再售期权有价值,自然 \(P(d)>\max_i q^i(d)\) 即便无泡沫。本模型不施加不完美租赁市场条件,故此泡沫定义是合理的。

36.3 一个例子

36.3.1 异质信念

设所有期只有两种红利 \(0

$$ \begin{cases} \pi^a(d_0|d_0)=\rho^a & \pi^b(d_0|d_0)=\rho^b\\ \pi^a(d_1|d_1)=\rho^a & \pi^b(d_1|d_1)=\rho^b\\ \pi^a(d_1|d_0)=1-\rho^a & \pi^b(d_1|d_0)=1-\rho^b\\ \pi^a(d_0|d_1)=1-\rho^a & \pi^b(d_0|d_1)=1-\rho^b \end{cases}\qquad \text{where }\rho^a>\rho^b $$

36.3.2 贝尔曼方程

\(a\) 型主体:

$$ q^a(d_0)=\beta\big[\rho^a(d_0+q^a(d_0))+(1-\rho^a)(d_1+q^a(d_1))\big] \tag{36.1} $$

$$ q^a(d_1)=\beta\big[(1-\rho^a)(d_0+q^a(d_0))+\rho^a(d_1+q^a(d_1))\big] \tag{36.2} $$

\(b\) 型主体:

$$ q^b(d_0)=\beta\big[\rho^b(d_0+q^b(d_0))+(1-\rho^b)(d_1+q^b(d_1))\big] \tag{36.3} $$

$$ q^b(d_1)=\beta\big[(1-\rho^b)(d_0+q^b(d_0))+\rho^b(d_1+q^b(d_1))\big] \tag{36.4} $$

36.3.3 异质信念导致价格泡沫的存在

Note

由 (36.1)–(36.4) 求基本面价值之和 合并 (36.1)、(36.2)(记 \(x\equiv q^a(d_0),y\equiv q^a(d_1)\)、\(m\equiv\beta\rho^a d_0+\beta(1-\rho^a)d_1\)、\(n\equiv\beta(1-\rho^a)d_0+\beta\rho^a d_1\)):\((1-\beta\rho^a)x=m+(\beta-\beta\rho^a)y\)、\((1-\beta\rho^a)y=n+(\beta-\beta\rho^a)x\);两式相加整理得 \((1-\beta)(x+y)=m+n=\beta(d_0+d_1)\),即 $$ > q^a(d_0)+q^a(d_1)=\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}(d_0+d_1) > $$ 同理 \(q^b(d_0)+q^b(d_1)=\dfrac{\beta}{1-\beta}(d_0+d_1)\)。

故 \(q^a(d_0)+q^a(d_1)=q^b(d_0)+q^b(d_1)\),即 \(q^a(d_0)-q^b(d_0)=-(q^a(d_1)-q^b(d_1))\)。由 (36.1)–(36.4) 不可能同时 \(q^a(d_0)=q^b(d_0)\) 与 \(q^a(d_1)=q^b(d_1)\),故不失一般性令

$$ q^a(d_1)>q^b(d_1),\qquad q^a(d_0)

由均衡价格定义 (36.0a):

$$ \begin{aligned} P(d_1)&=\max_i\beta\big[\rho^i(d_1+P(d_1))+(1-\rho^i)(d_0+P(d_0))\big]\\ &\ge\max_i\beta\big[\rho^i(d_1+q^a(d_1))+(1-\rho^i)(d_0+q^a(d_0))\big]\\ &\ge\beta\big[\rho^a(d_1+q^a(d_1))+(1-\rho^a)(d_0+q^a(d_0))\big]=q^a(d_1) \end{aligned} $$

类似地 \(P(d_0)\ge\beta\big[\rho^b(d_0+q^b(d_0))+(1-\rho^b)(d_1+q^b(d_1))\big]=q^b(d_0)\),且不等式严格。故

$$ P(d_0)>q^b(d_0)=\max_i q^i(d_0),\qquad P(d_1)>q^a(d_1)=\max_i q^i(d_1) $$

即在 \(d_0\) 与 \(d_1\) 两种红利状态下都存在泡沫,按本模型泡沫定义,资产价格中存在泡沫。

Tip

注记 36.2 泡沫的存在源于两类主体的异质信念。这一思想恰是再售期权:简言之,主体以高于其期望价值的价格买入股票,因为他们相信下期很可能有人会以更高于期望价值的价格把它买回去。

Note

参考文献 Harrison and Kreps. "Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations." Quarterly Journal of Economics (1978).

36. Heterogeneous Beliefs

Sometimes people disagree about the fundamental value of an asset. This assumption is most appropriate when the asset is relatively new such that no enough information could possibly be gathered by any person to correctly update their prior beliefs. In reality, this kind of new asset is always associated with some technological innovations such as the .COM boom in late 1990s (internet stock bubble), the financial innovation (housing market bubble) around 2007 and the bitcoin boom relatively recently.

In this section, we think about a model where agents can have heterogeneous beliefs about the fundamental of an asset, and in that setting we can define and discuss asset price bubbles in a different way. We can see that the existence of bubbles is actually due to speculative strategy (resale option) based on heterogeneous beliefs.

36.1 Set-up

  • Agents are indexed by \(i\in\mathcal{I}\), where \(\mathcal{I}\) is the set of all agents. Assume that agents are all risk neutral, and all agents have the same discount factor \(\beta\).
  • An asset has dividends in each period that follows a first-order Markov process. Denote the current period dividends by \(d\in D\) and the next period dividends by \(d'\in D\). Suppose the true underlying transition probability from \(d\) to \(d'\) for any \(d,d'\in D\) is \(\pi(d'|d)\), which is never observed. Denote agent \(i\)'s subjective transition probability by \(\pi^i(d'|d)\).

36.2 The price of the asset and the bubble

The value of the asset ex dividend today is the discounted sum of the dividends of next period and the price of next period at which the holder can resell the asset. Since agents have disagreement on the fundamental of the stock (in particular, on the transition probability in this model), the agent who values the stock most will end up getting all the assets. Here we implicitly assume that no short-sell is allowed, and thus it is possible for all the supply of the asset to be completely absorbed by the agent who values the stock most.

  • By such assumptions, we can define the equilibrium price \(P(d)\) as a function of current dividend \(d\), where

$$ P(d)=\max_i\beta\sum_{d'\in D}\pi^i(d'|d)\big(d'+P(d')\big) \tag{36.0a} $$

  • Similarly, we can define \(q^i(d)\) as the highest price for agent \(i\) to buy and hold the asset forever, then

$$ q^i(d)=\beta\sum_{d'\in D}\pi^i(d'|d)\big(d'+q^i(d')\big) \tag{36.0b} $$

Note that the \(q^i(d)\) is the fundamental ex dividend value of the asset to agent \(i\) if the current dividend was \(d\).

Important

Definition 36.1 (Bubble) We say that there is an asset price bubble if and only if $$ > P(d)>\max_i q^i(d) > $$

Tip

Remark 36.1 The definition 36.1 of bubbles makes sense because it is intuitive to claim the existence of a bubble if the price exceeds everyone's fundamental valuation. But it is also possible to have \(P(d)>\max_i q^i(d)\) without having a bubble when the rental market is imperfect, which is true because imperfect rental market means that the discounted future dividends cannot be sold perfectly (equal value) piece by piece to the market, so the resale option becomes valuable and thus it is natural that \(P(d)>\max_i q^i(d)\) even by definition of \(q^i\) even without bubbles. But in this model, we are not imposing any imperfect rental market condition, so this definition of bubble is legitimate.

36.3 An example

36.3.1 Heterogeneous beliefs

Suppose that there are only two types of dividends for all periods, \(0

$$ \begin{cases} \pi^a(d_0|d_0)=\rho^a & \pi^b(d_0|d_0)=\rho^b\\ \pi^a(d_1|d_1)=\rho^a & \pi^b(d_1|d_1)=\rho^b\\ \pi^a(d_1|d_0)=1-\rho^a & \pi^b(d_1|d_0)=1-\rho^b\\ \pi^a(d_0|d_1)=1-\rho^a & \pi^b(d_0|d_1)=1-\rho^b \end{cases}\qquad \text{where }\rho^a>\rho^b $$

36.3.2 Bellman equations

For type \(a\) agents:

$$ q^a(d_0)=\beta\big[\rho^a(d_0+q^a(d_0))+(1-\rho^a)(d_1+q^a(d_1))\big] \tag{36.1} $$

$$ q^a(d_1)=\beta\big[(1-\rho^a)(d_0+q^a(d_0))+\rho^a(d_1+q^a(d_1))\big] \tag{36.2} $$

For type \(b\) agents:

$$ q^b(d_0)=\beta\big[\rho^b(d_0+q^b(d_0))+(1-\rho^b)(d_1+q^b(d_1))\big] \tag{36.3} $$

$$ q^b(d_1)=\beta\big[(1-\rho^b)(d_0+q^b(d_0))+\rho^b(d_1+q^b(d_1))\big] \tag{36.4} $$

36.3.3 The existence of a price bubble due to heterogeneous beliefs

Note

Finding the sum of fundamental values from (36.1)–(36.4) Combine (36.1) and (36.2) (denote \(x\equiv q^a(d_0),y\equiv q^a(d_1)\), \(m\equiv\beta\rho^a d_0+\beta(1-\rho^a)d_1\), \(n\equiv\beta(1-\rho^a)d_0+\beta\rho^a d_1\)): \((1-\beta\rho^a)x=m+(\beta-\beta\rho^a)y\) and \((1-\beta\rho^a)y=n+(\beta-\beta\rho^a)x\); adding the two and rearranging gives \((1-\beta)(x+y)=m+n=\beta(d_0+d_1)\), i.e. $$ > q^a(d_0)+q^a(d_1)=\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}(d_0+d_1) > $$ Similarly, \(q^b(d_0)+q^b(d_1)=\dfrac{\beta}{1-\beta}(d_0+d_1)\).

So \(q^a(d_0)+q^a(d_1)=q^b(d_0)+q^b(d_1)\), i.e. \(q^a(d_0)-q^b(d_0)=-(q^a(d_1)-q^b(d_1))\). From (36.1)–(36.4), we know that it cannot be that \(q^a(d_0)=q^b(d_0)\) and \(q^a(d_1)=q^b(d_1)\), so we can arbitrarily (WLOG) let

$$ q^a(d_1)>q^b(d_1),\qquad q^a(d_0)

By definition of equilibrium price (36.0a),

$$ \begin{aligned} P(d_1)&=\max_i\beta\big[\rho^i(d_1+P(d_1))+(1-\rho^i)(d_0+P(d_0))\big]\\ &\ge\max_i\beta\big[\rho^i(d_1+q^a(d_1))+(1-\rho^i)(d_0+q^a(d_0))\big]\\ &\ge\beta\big[\rho^a(d_1+q^a(d_1))+(1-\rho^a)(d_0+q^a(d_0))\big]=q^a(d_1) \end{aligned} $$

and similarly \(P(d_0)\ge\beta\big[\rho^b(d_0+q^b(d_0))+(1-\rho^b)(d_1+q^b(d_1))\big]=q^b(d_0)\), with strict inequality. So we can conclude that

$$ P(d_0)>q^b(d_0)=\max_i q^i(d_0),\qquad P(d_1)>q^a(d_1)=\max_i q^i(d_1) $$

which means that there is a bubble in the asset price (per definition of bubble in this model) at both dividend states \(d_0\) and \(d_1\).

Tip

Remark 36.2 The existence of a bubble is due to the heterogeneous beliefs of two types of agents. This idea is exactly the resale option. In a nutshell, agents buy the stock at a higher than expectation value because they believe it is very likely that in the next period someone will buy it back at a higher than expectation value.

Note

References Harrison and Kreps. "Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations." Quarterly Journal of Economics (1978).