25. Finance and Development
本章主题:金融与发展。 §25.1 La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) 外部融资的法律决定因素:因果链 殖民史 ⇒ 法律结构 ⇒ 金融发展 ⇒ 增长,本文聚焦中段(法律结构 → 金融发展)。用 49 国证明投资者保护更差的国家(法国民法系)资本市场弱于保护更强者(英美普通法系)。普通法由法官造、重判例、难被游说改法 → 投资者保护更好(普通法最护股东/债权人,德/北欧民法居中,法国民法最弱)。结果:更强投资者保护 → 更好的外部融资市场、更大股权市场、更多上市公司/IPO、更多未偿债务(图 25.1–25.5)。§25.2 Rajan-Zingales (1998):更依赖外部融资(而非留存收益)的公司更受金融市场发展影响。先用美国数据测行业 \(j\) 的外部融资依赖 \(=\frac{\text{capex}_j-\text{cash flow}_j}{\text{capex}_j}\)(假设美国资本市场近无摩擦),再用 54 国数据检验。主回归 (25.1) 中只保留外部依赖 × 国家金融发展的交互项(行业/国家固定效应吸收了两个单项)。结果:交互项总显著为正——外部融资依赖度高的行业在金融更发达的国家增长更快(图 25.6、25.7)。Remark 25.1:这三篇都聚焦金融发展的光明面;暗面是金融发展/放松管制可能酿成危机——金融发展带来更高但更波动的经济结果。
Chapter theme: finance and development. §25.1 La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) legal determinants of external finance: the causality chain colonial history ⇒ legal structure ⇒ financial development ⇒ growth, this paper focusing on the middle (legal structure → financial development). Using 49 countries to show countries with poorer investor protection (French civil law) have weaker capital markets than those with stronger protection (Anglo-American common law). Common law is made by judges, emphasizes precedent, and is hard to lobby to change → better investor protection (common law protects shareholders/creditors most, German/Scandinavian civil law in the middle, French civil law least). Results: stronger investor protection → better external financial market, larger equity market, more listed firms/IPOs, more outstanding debt (Figures 25.1–25.5). §25.2 Rajan-Zingales (1998): firms more reliant on external financing (rather than retained earnings) are more influenced by financial-market development. First measure industry \(j\)'s external-finance dependence using US data \(=\frac{\text{capex}_j-\text{cash flow}_j}{\text{capex}_j}\) (assuming US capital markets are nearly frictionless), then test with 54-country data. The main regression (25.1) keeps only the external dependence × country financial development interaction (industry/country FE absorb the two separate terms). Result: the interaction is always significantly positive — industries more reliant on external finance grow faster in countries with more developed financial markets (Figures 25.6, 25.7). Remark 25.1: all three papers focus on the bright side of financial development; the dark side is that financial development/deregulation may create crises — financial development brings higher but more fluctuating economic outcomes.
25.1 Legal Determinants of External Finance: La Porta et al. (1997)
合理的因果链为:殖民史 \(\overset{\text{effect}}{\Rightarrow}\) 法律结构 \(\overset{\text{effect}}{\Rightarrow}\) 金融发展 \(\overset{\text{effect}}{\Rightarrow}\) 增长。La Porta et al. (1997) 聚焦中段(法律结构 \(\to\) 金融发展),用 49 国样本证明投资者保护更差的国家(法国民法系)比保护更强者(普通法系)有更弱的资本市场。
背景:英国法是普通法 (common law),由法官制定、随后纳入立法(英国及其殖民地);法国、德国、北欧法是民法 (civil law),部分由学者与立法者制定、依赖成文法与综合法典(法国法典 1807 年成型、输出至比利时/荷兰/波兰/意大利/墨西哥;德国法典 1897 年、输出至澳大利亚/日本/瑞士)。普通法给法官更多灵活性与权力、重判例 → 任何一方更难游说出对己有利的新法 → 普通法国家投资者保护更好。普通法最护股东与债权人、德国民法与北欧民法居中、法国民法最弱(排名由 La Porta et al. 1998 表 I 的度量得到)。
结果:不同法律渊源国家在外部融资市场与投资者保护上的比较见图 25.1——投资者保护更强的国家外部金融市场更好。外部市值 (External cap) = 股市市值 × 一国十大非金融私有国内公司中不为前三大股东持有的普通股百分比。民法系(保护差)→ 更小的股权资本市场(图 25.2,External Cap/GNP 对 GDP 增长、log GNP、法治、法/德/北欧渊源、董事保护权、一股一票回归);→ 更少的人均国内公司数(图 25.3);→ 更少的人均 IPO(图 25.4);→ 更少的 GNP 标准化未偿债务(图 25.5)。La Porta et al. (1998) 实早于 (1997) 写就,首次确立法律与金融发展的思想、用 49 国细致分析法律各维度对金融发展的作用,是 (1997) 回归分析的基础;二者共享同一思想:投资者保护更好的法律体系 → 更发达的金融体系。
The reasonable chain of causality is: colonial history \(\overset{\text{effect}}{\Rightarrow}\) legal structure \(\overset{\text{effect}}{\Rightarrow}\) financial development \(\overset{\text{effect}}{\Rightarrow}\) growth. La Porta et al. (1997) focus on the middle (legal structure \(\to\) financial development), using a sample of 49 countries to show countries with poorer investor protection (French civil law) have weaker capital markets than those with stronger protection (common law).
Background: English law is common law, made by judges and subsequently incorporated into legislature (England + its colonies); French, German, and Scandinavian laws are civil law, made partly by scholars and legislators, relying on statutes and comprehensive codes (the French code developed in 1807, exported to Belgium/Holland/Poland/Italy/Mexico; the German code in 1897, exported to Australia/Japan/Switzerland). Common law gives the judge more flexibility and power and emphasizes precedent → it's harder for any party to lobby for new legislation in their favor → common-law countries have better investor protection. Common law protects shareholders and creditors most, German and Scandinavian civil law are in the middle, French civil law protects investors least (the ranking from the metrics in Table I of La Porta et al. 1998).
Results: comparisons of different law-origin countries on the external-finance market and investor protection are in Figure 25.1 — countries with stronger investor protection have a better external financial market. External cap = stock market capitalization × the percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial privately owned domestic firms in a country. Civil law (worse protection) → a smaller equity capital market (Figure 25.2, regressing External Cap/GNP on GDP growth, log GNP, rule of law, French/German/Scandinavian origin, antidirector rights, one-share-one-vote); → fewer domestic firms per population (Figure 25.3); → fewer IPOs per population (Figure 25.4); → less GNP-normalized outstanding debt (Figure 25.5). La Porta et al. (1998) was actually written before (1997); it first establishes the law-and-finance-development idea and uses 49 countries to thoroughly analyze each dimension of law on financial development, serving as the basis for the (1997) regressions; both share the idea: a legal system with better investor protection → a better-developed financial system.
25.2 Financial Market Matters for External-Financing-Relying Firms: Rajan and Zingales (1998)
Rajan-Zingales (1998) 探讨:更依赖外部融资(而非自身留存收益)的公司应更受金融市场发展影响。数据:联合国统计司的工业统计年鉴;部分变量(GDP、PPI、汇率、工业生产指数)来自 IMF 国际金融统计。实证策略:先用美国数据识别行业 \(j\) 的外部融资需求 \(\text{Dependence}_j=\frac{\text{capex}_j-\text{cash flow}_j}{\text{capex}_j}\)(投资减去经营产生的现金);再假设美国资本市场相对无摩擦,把该行业依赖度套用到其他国家;最后用其余 54 国数据检验「更依赖外部融资的行业是否在金融更发达的国家增长更快」。主回归
$$\text{Growth}_{j,k}=\text{const}+\sum_k\beta_{1,k}\text{Country Indicator}_k+\sum_j\beta_{2,j}\text{Industry Indicator}_j+\sum_{j,k}\beta_{3,j,k}\text{Industry's share of manufacturing in 1980}_{j,k}+\sum_{j,k}\gamma_j\big(\text{External dependence}_j\times\text{Country's financial development}_j\big)+\varepsilon_{j,k} \tag{25.1}$$
外部依赖 \(=\frac{\text{capex}_j-\text{cash flow}_j}{\text{capex}_j}\);国家金融发展三种度量(会计准则——CIFAR 对年报披露量的排名指数;总市值/GDP——股权市值 + 国内信贷之和与 GDP 之比;私人部门国内信贷/GDP)。(25.1) 中只保留交互项而非两个单项,因两单项已被行业 FE(Industry Indicator\(_j\))与国家 FE(Country Indicator\(_k\))吸收。结果:无论用哪种金融发展度量,交互项总显著为正 → 外部融资依赖度高的行业在金融更发达国家增长更快(图 25.6,因变量为行业-国家 1980–1990 实际增加值的年复合增长率);财务依赖度高的行业(药品、塑料、计算机)在金融更发达(会计准则好)国家表现更好,依赖度低的(烟草、陶器、皮革)在金融欠发达国家表现更好(图 25.7)。
Remark 25.1 La Porta et al. (1997)、La Porta et al. (1998)、Rajan-Zingales (1998) 都聚焦金融发展的光明面。然而也有暗面:金融发展及伴随的金融放松管制可能酿成危机。结论应是:金融发展带来更高的最终经济结果,但以更波动的方式。
Rajan-Zingales (1998) explore: firms more reliant on external financing (rather than their own retained earnings) should be more influenced by financial-market development. Data: the UN Statistical Division's Industrial Statistics Year-Book; some variables (GDP, PPI, exchange rate, industrial-production index) from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. Empirical strategy: first use US data to identify industry \(j\)'s need for external finance \(\text{Dependence}_j=\frac{\text{capex}_j-\text{cash flow}_j}{\text{capex}_j}\) (investment minus cash from operations); then assume US capital markets are relatively frictionless to apply that dependence to other countries; finally use the other 54 countries' data to test whether industries more reliant on external finance grow faster in countries with more developed financial markets. Main regression
$$\text{Growth}_{j,k}=\text{const}+\sum_k\beta_{1,k}\text{Country Indicator}_k+\sum_j\beta_{2,j}\text{Industry Indicator}_j+\sum_{j,k}\beta_{3,j,k}\text{Industry's share of manufacturing in 1980}_{j,k}+\sum_{j,k}\gamma_j\big(\text{External dependence}_j\times\text{Country's financial development}_j\big)+\varepsilon_{j,k} \tag{25.1}$$
external dependence \(=\frac{\text{capex}_j-\text{cash flow}_j}{\text{capex}_j}\); country financial development is measured three ways (accounting standards — the CIFAR index ranking disclosure in annual reports; total capitalization/GDP — the ratio of equity market cap + domestic credit to GDP; domestic credit to the private sector/GDP). (25.1) keeps only the interaction rather than the two separate terms, since those are absorbed by the industry FE (Industry Indicator\(_j\)) and country FE (Country Indicator\(_k\)). Result: for any measure of financial development, the interaction is always significantly positive → industries more reliant on external finance grow faster in countries with more developed financial markets (Figure 25.6, the dependent variable being the industry-country annual compounded growth rate in real value added 1980–1990); more financially dependent industries (Drug, Plastics, Computers) perform better in more developed (better accounting standards) countries, while less dependent ones (Tobacco, Pottery, Leather) perform better in less developed ones (Figure 25.7).
Remark 25.1 La Porta et al. (1997), La Porta et al. (1998), and Rajan-Zingales (1998) all focus on the bright side of financial development. But there is also a dark side: financial development and the accompanying deregulation may create crises. The takeaway should be: financial development brings a higher final economic outcome, but in a more fluctuating way.
References
- La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1997). Legal determinants of external finance. The Journal of Finance 52(3), 1131–1150.
- La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 106(6), 1113–1155.
- Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales (1998). Financial dependence and growth. The American Economic Review 88(3), 559.