32. Convex Adjustment Cost

Note

本组导读:投资(Investment) 企业在资本上大幅调整总是有成本的。成本可能包括安装、寻找资本、调整资本期间可能放缓的生产,此外还有资本购买成本本身。有几类模型刻画资本调整成本,其动机也来自经验证据:企业的资本存量对生产率冲击反应缓慢,且托宾(平均)\(q\) 并不总等于 \(1\)。

我们将讨论一些有用的基线模型来描述这一现象——在总量层面而非微观层面,因为这些模型假设企业同质。其中一些假设凸调整成本,另一些假设非凸调整成本(特别是假设资本买卖价格之间有楔子、或假设固定调整成本、或假设个体企业的融资约束)。我们主要讨论凸调整成本模型与资本买卖价格楔子模型。

先简要想一下另两个模型: - 固定成本模型:假设每次企业调整都支付一个由其生产率决定的固定成本,结果与资本买卖价格楔子模型类似。 - 融资约束模型:假设每个个体企业面对不同的融资成本,故其购买资本的成本高于资本价格且异质。

文献中还有许多其他设定。但从凸调整成本开始思考这个问题是自然的。

32. 凸调整成本

32.1 设定

  • 企业在日期 \(t\)、给定历史 \(s^t\) 与资本存量 \(k_t(s^{t-1})\) 的价值记为 \(V_t(s^t,k_t(s^{t-1}))\);日期 \(0\) 的价值函数为 \(V_0(s^0,k_0(s^{-1}))\)。
  • 企业的 CRS 生产函数 \(f(k_t(s^{t-1}),z_t(s^t)h_t(s^t))\),\(z_t(s^t)\) 是劳动生产率、\(h_t(s^t)\) 是雇佣劳动量。
  • 工资 \(w_t(s^t)\) 被企业视为给定(由均衡内生决定)。
  • 所有期、所有状态都有完备市场,即状态依存价格 \(\{q_0^t(s^t)\}\) 良定;\(q_0^t(s^t)\) 是"历史 \(s^t\) 下 \(t\) 期一单位商品"以日期 \(0\) 商品计价的价格。
  • 从 \(k_t(s^{t-1})\) 切换到 \(k_{t+1}(s^t)\) 的调整成本为 \(C\!\left(\dfrac{k_{t+1}(s^t)}{k_t(s^{t-1})}\right)\times k_t(s^{t-1})\),其中 \(C(\cdot)\) 是凸函数,刻画调整成本中的凸性。
    • 按定义 \(C(1)\) 应为折旧率。例如 \(C(\gamma)=\dfrac{\gamma\delta}{1+\delta(1-\gamma)}\) 满足这些要求(\(\delta\) 为资本折旧率,\(C(1)=\delta\))。
    • CRS 性质也嵌入调整成本中,因总调整成本正比于 \(k_t(s^{t-1})\)。

32.2 企业问题与托宾 \(q\)

32.2.1 企业问题

$$ V_0(s^0,k_0(s^{-1}))=\max_{\{h_t(s^t),k_{t+1}(s^t)\}}\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\sum_{s^t}q_0^t(s^t)\left[f(k_t(s^{t-1}),z_t(s^t)h_t(s^t))-w_t(s^t)h_t(s^t)-C\!\left(\frac{k_{t+1}(s^t)}{k_t(s^{t-1})}\right)\times k_t(s^{t-1})\right] \tag{32.1} $$

32.2.2 CRS 生产与调整成本下托宾平均 \(q\) 与边际 \(q\) 的等价

Important

定义 32.1(托宾平均 \(q\) 与边际 \(q\)) 设企业当期(\(0\) 期)价值为 \(V_0(s^0,k_0(s^{-1}))\),则托宾平均 \(q\) 与边际 \(q\) 分别定义为 $$ > q_{\text{avg}}\equiv\frac{V_0(s^0,k_0(s^{-1}))}{k_0(s^{-1})},\qquad q_{\text{marg}}\equiv\frac{\partial V_0(s^0,k_0(s^{-1}))}{\partial k_0(s^{-1})} > $$

Important

命题 32.1 在 CRS 生产技术与 CRS 调整成本下,托宾平均 \(q\) 与边际 \(q\) 等价。

Note

证明 设企业从 \(k_0\) 出发,对应最优政策 \(h_t^{\star}(s^t;k_0)\)、\(k_{t+1}^{\star}(s^t;k_0)\)。若企业从 \(\hat k_0=\lambda k_0\)(\(\lambda>0\))出发,则政策 \(\hat h_t(s^t;\lambda k_0)=h_t^{\star}(s^t;k_0)\)、\(\hat k_{t+1}(s^t;\lambda k_0)=\lambda k_{t+1}^{\star}(s^t;k_0)\) 仍可行(由 \(f(k,zh)\) 与调整成本 \(C(k_{t+1}/k_t)k_t\) 的 CRS)。可行性蕴含 $$ > V_0(s^0,\lambda k_0)\ge\lambda V_0(s^0,k_0) \tag{32.2} > $$ 反之,设企业从 \(\lambda k_0\) 出发对应最优政策 \(h_t^{\star}(s^t;\lambda k_0)\)、\(k_{t+1}^{\star}(s^t;\lambda k_0)\);若从 \(k_0\) 出发,政策 \(\frac{1}{\lambda}h_t^{\star}\)、\(\frac{1}{\lambda}k_{t+1}^{\star}\) 仍可行,故 $$ > V_0(s^0,k_0)\ge\frac{1}{\lambda}V_0(s^0,\lambda k_0) \tag{32.3} > $$ (32.3) 乘 \(\lambda\) 并与 (32.2) 结合得 \(V_0(s^0,\lambda k_0)=\lambda V_0(s^0,k_0)\)。记托宾平均 \(q\) 为 \(v_0(s^0)\equiv\frac{V_0(s^0,k_0)}{k_0}\),则 \(v_0(s^0)=\frac{k_0 V_0(s^0,1)}{k_0}=V_0(s^0,1)\),且 $$ > \frac{\partial V_0(s^0,k_0)}{\partial k_0}=\frac{\partial(k_0 V_0(s^0,1))}{\partial k_0}=\frac{\partial(k_0 v_0(s^0))}{\partial k_0}=v_0(s^0) > $$ 故 \(\dfrac{V_0(s^0,k_0)}{k_0}=v_0(s^0)=\dfrac{\partial V_0(s^0,k_0)}{\partial k_0}\),即托宾平均 \(q\) = 托宾边际 \(q\)。\(\blacksquare\)

32.2.3 企业问题的结果

记 \(f_{h,t}(s^t)\equiv\dfrac{\partial f(k_t(s^{t-1}),z_t(s^t)h_t(s^t))}{\partial h_t(s^t)}\)、\(f_{k,t}(s^t)\equiv\dfrac{\partial f(k_t(s^{t-1}),z_t(s^t)h_t(s^t))}{\partial k_t(s^{t-1})}\)。

对 \(h_t(s^t)\) 的一阶条件:\(f_{h,t}(s^t)=w_t(s^t)\)(MPL = 工资),意味 \(\dfrac{k_t(s^{t-1})}{h_t(s^t)}\) 只依赖 \(w_t(s^t)\) 与 \(z_t(s^t)\)。

对 \(k_{t+1}(s^t)\) 的一阶条件:

$$ C'\!\left(\frac{k_{t+1}(s^t)}{k_t(s^{t-1})}\right)=\sum_{s^{t+1}>s^t}\frac{q_0^{t+1}(s^{t+1})}{q_0^t(s^t)}\left[f_{k,t+1}(s^{t+1})+C'\!\left(\frac{k_{t+2}(s^{t+1})}{k_{t+1}(s^t)}\right)\frac{k_{t+2}(s^{t+1})}{k_{t+1}(s^t)}\right] $$

对 \(k_0\) 的包络条件(对 (32.1) 两边关于 \(k_0\) 求导):

$$ v_0(s^0)=f_{k,0}(s^0)-C\!\left(\frac{k_1(s^0)}{k_0(s^{-1})}\right)+C'\!\left(\frac{k_1(s^0)}{k_0(s^{-1})}\right)\frac{k_1(s^0)}{k_0(s^{-1})} \tag{32.4} $$

记 \(\gamma_t(s^t)\equiv\dfrac{k_{t+1}(s^t)}{k_t(s^{t-1})}\),则 (32.4) 改写为

$$ v_0(s^0)-f_{k,0}(s^0)=C'(\gamma_0(s^0))\gamma_0(s^0)-C(\gamma_0(s^0)) \tag{32.5} $$

对 (32.5) 的 RHS 关于 \(\gamma_0(s^0)\) 求导:

$$ C''(\gamma_0(s^0))\gamma_0(s^0)+C'(\gamma_0(s^0))-C'(\gamma_0(s^0))=C''(\gamma_0(s^0))\gamma_0(s^0)>0 $$

由 \(C(\cdot)\) 的凸性成立。故 \(v_0(s^0)-f_{k,0}(s^0)\) 关于 \(\gamma_0(s^0)\) 递增;从期 \(t\) 起评价价值函数亦然,即 \(v_t(s^t)-f_{k,t}(s^t)\) 关于 \(\gamma_t(s^t)\) 递增。(32.5) 的等式意味反向也成立,即 \(\gamma_t(s^t)\) 关于 \(v_t(s^t)-f_{k,t}(s^t)\) 递增。

  • \(\gamma_t(s^t)\) 代表资本投资,\(v_t(s^t)-f_{k,t}(s^t)\) 基本上就是托宾 \(q\),即从下一期起一额外单位资本所创造的额外价值。
  • \(\gamma_t(s^t)\) 与 \(v_t(s^t)-f_{k,t}(s^t)\) 的单调关系意味企业是前瞻的:更高的托宾 \(q\) 会导致今日更高的投资。
Tip

注记 32.1 \(\gamma_t(s^t)\) 与 \(v_t(s^t)-f_{k,t}(s^t)\) 的单调性来自调整成本函数的凸性。若调整成本非凸,则一般不会有此结果。

Note

参考文献 - Lucas and Prescott. "Investment Under Uncertainty." Econometrica (1971). - Hayashi. "Tobin's Marginal \(q\) and Average \(q\): A Neoclassical Interpretation." Econometrica (1982).

Note

Group overview: Investment It is always costly for the firms to involve in big swings in capital. The cost may involve installment, search for capital and potentially slowed-down production during the capital adjustment, which are in addition to the capital purchase cost. There are several types of models that capture such adjustment cost in capital. The motivations of such models also come from empirical evidence that firms' capital stock responds slowly to shocks in productivity and that Tobin's (average) \(q\) is not always equal to 1.

We are going to discuss some baseline models that are useful to describe this phenomenon in aggregate level, not micro level, because such models assume homogeneity in firms. Among those models, some assume convex adjustment cost, while others assume non-convex adjustment cost (in particular assuming wedge between buy and sell prices of capital, or assuming fixed cost of adjustment, or assuming financing constraint of individual firms). We will be mainly talking about the convex adjustment cost model, and the capital-buy-sell-price-wedge model.

Before starting talking about those two models, we can briefly think about the other two models: - Fixed cost model: it is assumed that every time the firm makes adjustment, it pays a fixed cost determined by its productivity, which has similar result as in the capital-buy-sell-price-wedge model. - Financing constraint model: it is assumed that every individual firm faces different cost of financing, so their costs of buying capital are more than capital price and are heterogeneous.

There are also many other interesting settings in the literature. But it is natural to start thinking about this problem with a convex adjustment cost.

32. Convex Adjustment Cost

32.1 Set-up

  • Firm's value at date \(t\) given history \(s^t\) and capital stock \(k_t(s^{t-1})\) is denoted by \(V_t(s^t,k_t(s^{t-1}))\). In particular, the value function at date 0 is \(V_0(s^0,k_0(s^{-1}))\).
  • Firms face constant return to scale (CRS) production function \(f(k_t(s^{t-1}),z_t(s^t)h_t(s^t))\) where \(z_t(s^t)\) is labor productivity and \(h_t(s^t)\) is the amount of hired labor.
  • Wages \(w_t(s^t)\) are taken as given by firms, which are endogenous results from the equilibrium.
  • There are complete markets for all periods and all states, which means that the state contingent prices \(\{q_0^t(s^t)\}\) are well-defined for all periods and all histories; \(q_0^t(s^t)\) is the price of one unit of good in period \(t\) with history \(s^t\) in terms of unit of good in period 0.
  • Adjustment cost for switching from \(k_t(s^{t-1})\) to \(k_{t+1}(s^t)\) is \(C\!\left(\dfrac{k_{t+1}(s^t)}{k_t(s^{t-1})}\right)\times k_t(s^{t-1})\).
    • \(C(\cdot)\) is a convex function, which captures the convexity in adjustment cost, and by definition \(C(1)\) should be the depreciation rate. For example, the following functional form satisfies such requirements: \(C(\gamma)=\dfrac{\gamma\delta}{1+\delta(1-\gamma)}\) where \(\delta\) is the depreciation rate of capital (\(C(1)=\delta\)).
    • The CRS property is also embedded in the adjustment cost, since the total adjustment cost is proportional to \(k_t(s^{t-1})\).

32.2 The firm's problem and Tobin's \(q\)

32.2.1 The firm's problem

A typical firm solves the following maximization problem:

$$ V_0(s^0,k_0(s^{-1}))=\max_{\{h_t(s^t),k_{t+1}(s^t)\}}\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\sum_{s^t}q_0^t(s^t)\left[f(k_t(s^{t-1}),z_t(s^t)h_t(s^t))-w_t(s^t)h_t(s^t)-C\!\left(\frac{k_{t+1}(s^t)}{k_t(s^{t-1})}\right)\times k_t(s^{t-1})\right] \tag{32.1} $$

32.2.2 Equivalence between Tobin's average \(q\) and marginal \(q\) with CRS production and adjustment cost

Important

Definition 32.1 (Tobin's average \(q\) and marginal \(q\)) Suppose a firm has a value \(V_0(s^0,k_0(s^{-1}))\) in current period 0, then $$ > \text{Tobin's average }q\equiv\frac{V_0(s^0,k_0(s^{-1}))}{k_0(s^{-1})},\qquad \text{Tobin's marginal }q\equiv\frac{\partial V_0(s^0,k_0(s^{-1}))}{\partial k_0(s^{-1})} > $$

Important

Proposition 32.1 With CRS production technology and CRS adjustment cost, Tobin's average \(q\) and marginal \(q\) are equivalent.

Note

Proof Suppose the firm starts with \(k_0\), and denote its corresponding optimal policy functions by \(h_t^{\star}(s^t;k_0)\) and \(k_{t+1}^{\star}(s^t;k_0)\). Then, if the firms start with \(\hat k_0=\lambda k_0\) for \(\lambda>0\), the policy functions \(\hat h_t(s^t;\lambda k_0)=h_t^{\star}(s^t;k_0)\) and \(\hat k_{t+1}(s^t;\lambda k_0)=\lambda k_{t+1}^{\star}(s^t;k_0)\) are still feasible because of the CRS property of both production function \(f(k,zh)\) and adjustment cost \(C\!\left(\frac{k_{t+1}}{k_t}\right)k_t\). So, the feasibility of \(\hat h_t(s^t;\lambda k_0)\) and \(\hat k_{t+1}(s^t;\lambda k_0)\) implies $$ > V_0(s^0,\lambda k_0)\ge\lambda V_0(s^0,k_0) \tag{32.2} > $$ Reversely, suppose the firm starts with \(\lambda k_0\) for the same \(\lambda>0\), and denote its corresponding optimal policy functions by \(h_t^{\star}(s^t;\lambda k_0)\) and \(k_{t+1}^{\star}(s^t;\lambda k_0)\). Then, if the firms start with \(k_0\), the policy functions \(\frac{1}{\lambda}h_t^{\star}(s^t;\lambda k_0)\) and \(\frac{1}{\lambda}k_{t+1}^{\star}(s^t;\lambda k_0)\) are still feasible, so the feasibility implies $$ > V_0(s^0,k_0)\ge\frac{1}{\lambda}V_0(s^0,\lambda k_0) \tag{32.3} > $$ Multiply (32.3) by \(\lambda\) and combine with (32.2): \(V_0(s^0,\lambda k_0)=\lambda V_0(s^0,k_0)\). Denote Tobin's average \(q\) by \(v_0(s^0)\equiv\frac{V_0(s^0,k_0)}{k_0}\), so \(v_0(s^0)=\frac{k_0 V_0(s^0,1)}{k_0}=V_0(s^0,1)\), and $$ > \frac{\partial V_0(s^0,k_0)}{\partial k_0}=\frac{\partial(k_0 V_0(s^0,1))}{\partial k_0}=\frac{\partial(k_0 v_0(s^0))}{\partial k_0}=v_0(s^0) > $$ which implies \(\dfrac{V_0(s^0,k_0)}{k_0}=v_0(s^0)=\dfrac{\partial V_0(s^0,k_0)}{\partial k_0}\), i.e. Tobin's average \(q\) = Tobin's marginal \(q\). \(\blacksquare\)

32.2.3 Results from the firm's problem

Denote \(f_{h,t}(s^t)\equiv\dfrac{\partial f(k_t(s^{t-1}),z_t(s^t)h_t(s^t))}{\partial h_t(s^t)}\) and \(f_{k,t}(s^t)\equiv\dfrac{\partial f(k_t(s^{t-1}),z_t(s^t)h_t(s^t))}{\partial k_t(s^{t-1})}\).

The f.o.c. for \(h_t(s^t)\) is \(f_{h,t}(s^t)=w_t(s^t)\) (MPL = wage), which means that \(\dfrac{k_t(s^{t-1})}{h_t(s^t)}\) only depends on \(w_t(s^t)\) and \(z_t(s^t)\).

The f.o.c. for \(k_{t+1}(s^t)\) is

$$ C'\!\left(\frac{k_{t+1}(s^t)}{k_t(s^{t-1})}\right)=\sum_{s^{t+1}>s^t}\frac{q_0^{t+1}(s^{t+1})}{q_0^t(s^t)}\left[f_{k,t+1}(s^{t+1})+C'\!\left(\frac{k_{t+2}(s^{t+1})}{k_{t+1}(s^t)}\right)\frac{k_{t+2}(s^{t+1})}{k_{t+1}(s^t)}\right] $$

The envelop condition for \(k_0\) (take derivative w.r.t. \(k_0\) on both sides of (32.1)):

$$ v_0(s^0)=f_{k,0}(s^0)-C\!\left(\frac{k_1(s^0)}{k_0(s^{-1})}\right)+C'\!\left(\frac{k_1(s^0)}{k_0(s^{-1})}\right)\frac{k_1(s^0)}{k_0(s^{-1})} \tag{32.4} $$

Denote \(\gamma_t(s^t)\equiv\dfrac{k_{t+1}(s^t)}{k_t(s^{t-1})}\), then (32.4) can be rewritten as

$$ v_0(s^0)-f_{k,0}(s^0)=C'(\gamma_0(s^0))\gamma_0(s^0)-C(\gamma_0(s^0)) \tag{32.5} $$

Take derivative w.r.t. \(\gamma_0(s^0)\) on the RHS of (32.5):

$$ C''(\gamma_0(s^0))\gamma_0(s^0)+C'(\gamma_0(s^0))-C'(\gamma_0(s^0))=C''(\gamma_0(s^0))\gamma_0(s^0)>0 $$

which is true due to the convexity in \(C(\cdot)\). So, \(v_0(s^0)-f_{k,0}(s^0)\) is increasing in \(\gamma_0(s^0)\), which is also true if we evaluate the value function starting in period \(t\), i.e. \(v_t(s^t)-f_{k,t}(s^t)\) is increasing in \(\gamma_t(s^t)\). The equality of (32.5) means that the reverse is also true, i.e. \(\gamma_t(s^t)\) is increasing in \(v_t(s^t)-f_{k,t}(s^t)\).

  • Note that \(\gamma_t(s^t)\) represents the capital investment, and \(v_t(s^t)-f_{k,t}(s^t)\), which is basically the Tobin's \(q\), is the extra value created by one additional unit of capital starting from the next period.
  • So, the monotonicity of \(\gamma_t(s^t)\) and \(v_t(s^t)-f_{k,t}(s^t)\) means that the firms are forward looking. The higher Tobin's \(q\) will lead to higher investment today.
Tip

Remark 32.1 The monotonicity of \(\gamma_t(s^t)\) and \(v_t(s^t)-f_{k,t}(s^t)\) comes from the convexity in adjustment cost function. If the adjustment cost is not convex, then we generally won't have this result.

Note

References - Lucas and Prescott. "Investment Under Uncertainty." Econometrica (1971). - Hayashi. "Tobin's Marginal \(q\) and Average \(q\): A Neoclassical Interpretation." Econometrica (1982).