21. Application of the Deterministic Monopolistic Screening Model

21. Application of the Deterministic Monopolistic Screening Model

Note

本章导读 本章把 Ch 20 的确定性垄断筛选机制设计应用于对电力生产商的规制政府是委托人,目标是最大化消费者剩余减转移支付 \(CS(q)-t\)(\(CS\) 关于 \(q\) 递增且凹);企业是代理人,成本 \(c(q)=\theta q+K\),类型 \(\theta\) 私人已知、累积分布 \(F(\theta)\) 于 \([\underline\theta,\overline\theta]\),企业利润 \(\Pi(q,t)=R(q)-\theta q-K+t\)。政府设计直接显示机制 \(\{q(\cdot),t(\cdot)\}\)。五步法与 Ch 20 平行,但因高成本类型 \(\theta\) 产出更少,\(q(\cdot)\) 非增、\(\Pi(\theta)\) 关于 \(\theta\) 递减:步骤 1 充要条件(\(q(\cdot)\) 非增、\(\Pi(\theta)=\Pi(\underline\theta)-\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta q(s)\,ds\));步骤 2 分部积分得 \(\mathbb{E}_\theta[\Pi(\theta)]=\Pi(\overline\theta)+\mathbb{E}_\theta[q(\theta)\frac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)}]\) (21.1);步骤 3 目标 (21.2)、\(\Lambda_q=0\) (21.3)、施加 \(\frac{F}{f}\) 递增保证 \(q'\le0\);步骤 4 恢复 \(\Pi(\cdot),t(\cdot)\);步骤 5 价格菜单 \(P(q)=t(\overline\theta(q))+R(q)\)。无图。

21. Application of the Deterministic Monopolistic Screening Model

Note

Overview This chapter applies the deterministic monopolistic-screening mechanism design of Ch 20 to the regulation of an electricity producer. The government is the principal, with the target of maximizing consumer surplus minus transfer \(CS(q)-t\) (\(CS\) increasing and concave in \(q\)); the firm is the agent, with cost \(c(q)=\theta q+K\), type \(\theta\) privately known with c.d.f. \(F(\theta)\) on \([\underline\theta,\overline\theta]\), and firm profit \(\Pi(q,t)=R(q)-\theta q-K+t\). The government designs the direct revelation mechanism \(\{q(\cdot),t(\cdot)\}\). The 5-step method parallels Ch 20, but since a higher-cost type \(\theta\) produces less, \(q(\cdot)\) is non-increasing and \(\Pi(\theta)\) decreasing in \(\theta\): Step 1 necessary-sufficient conditions (\(q(\cdot)\) non-increasing, \(\Pi(\theta)=\Pi(\underline\theta)-\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta q(s)\,ds\)); Step 2 integration by parts gives \(\mathbb{E}_\theta[\Pi(\theta)]=\Pi(\overline\theta)+\mathbb{E}_\theta[q(\theta)\frac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)}]\) (21.1); Step 3 objective (21.2), \(\Lambda_q=0\) (21.3), imposing \(\frac{F}{f}\) increasing ensures \(q'\le0\); Step 4 recover \(\Pi(\cdot),t(\cdot)\); Step 5 price menu \(P(q)=t(\overline\theta(q))+R(q)\). No figures.

我们将讨论一个电力生产合约模型。

21.1 设定 / Set-up

We will talk about a model for an electricity-producing contract.

21.1 Set-up

Important

设定 / Set-up 政府是委托人,目标是最大化消费者剩余减转移支付 \(CS(q)-t\):\(q\) 为电力产量;\(CS(\cdot)\) 是关于 \(q\) 递增且凹的消费者剩余;\(t\) 为消费者向电力企业的转移支付。企业是代理人,成本 \(c(q)=\theta q+K\),其中 \(\theta\) 是企业私人已知的类型,累积分布 \(F(\theta)\)、支撑 \([\underline\theta,\overline\theta]\);企业利润 \(\Pi(q,t)=R(q)-c(q)+t=R(q)-\theta q-K+t\),其中 \(R(q)\) 是企业生产 \(q\) 电力(除转移 \(t\) 外)的收入。政府设计的直接显示机制为 \(\{q(\cdot),t(\cdot)\}\)。The government is the principal, whose target is to maximize consumer surplus minus transfer \(CS(q)-t\): \(q\) is the amount of produced electricity; \(CS(\cdot)\) is the consumer surplus, increasing and concave in \(q\); \(t\) is the transfer payment from consumers to the electricity firm. The firm is the agent, with cost \(c(q)=\theta q+K\), where \(\theta\) is the firm's privately known type with c.d.f. \(F(\theta)\) on support \([\underline\theta,\overline\theta]\); the firm's profit is \(\Pi(q,t)=R(q)-c(q)+t=R(q)-\theta q-K+t\), where \(R(q)\) is the firm's revenue from producing \(q\) amount of electricity other than from the transfer \(t\). The direct revelation mechanism designed by the government is \(\{q(\cdot),t(\cdot)\}\).

21.2 五步法 / The 5 steps

21.2.1 步骤 1 / Step 1

用充要条件刻画 IC/可实施机制。机制应满足:条件 1:\(q(\cdot)\) 非增;条件 2:\(\Pi(\theta)=\Pi(\underline\theta)-\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta q(s)\,ds\) 对 \(\forall\theta\)。

21.2 The 5 steps

21.2.1 Step 1

Use the necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize the IC/implementable mechanism. It should satisfy: Condition 1: \(q(\cdot)\) non-increasing; Condition 2: \(\Pi(\theta)=\Pi(\underline\theta)-\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta q(s)\,ds\) for \(\forall\theta\).

Note

证明(必要性)/ Proof (necessity) 可实施显示机制须满足 \(\Pi(\theta)=\max_{\hat\theta}\underbrace{R(q(\hat\theta))-\theta q(\hat\theta)-K+t(\hat\theta)}_{\equiv\Pi(\hat\theta\mid\theta)}=\max_{\hat\theta}\Pi(\hat\theta\mid\theta)\)。条件 2:由包络条件 \(\Pi'(\theta)=\Pi_2(\hat\theta\mid\theta)|_{\hat\theta=\theta}=-q(\hat\theta)|_{\hat\theta=\theta}=-q(\theta)\),故 \(\Pi(\theta)=\Pi(\underline\theta)+\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta\Pi'(\theta)\,d\theta=\Pi(\underline\theta)-\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta q(\theta)\,d\theta\)。条件 1:由一阶条件 \(\Pi_1(\hat\theta\mid\theta)|_{\hat\theta=\theta}=0\) 与局部二阶条件 \(\Pi_{11}(\hat\theta\mid\theta)|_{\hat\theta=\theta}\le0\),全微分 \(\Pi_1=0\) 得 \(\underbrace{\Pi_{11}(\theta\mid\theta)}_{\le0}d\theta+\Pi_{12}(\theta\mid\theta)\,d\theta=0\Rightarrow\Pi_{12}(\theta\mid\theta)\ge0\);而 \(\Pi_{12}(\theta\mid\theta)=\Pi_{21}(\theta\mid\theta)=-q'(\theta)\ge0\Leftrightarrow q'(\theta)\le0\),证毕。条件 1、2 也充分(同 §20.4.3)。\(\blacksquare\)An implementable revelation mechanism must satisfy \(\Pi(\theta)=\max_{\hat\theta}\underbrace{R(q(\hat\theta))-\theta q(\hat\theta)-K+t(\hat\theta)}_{\equiv\Pi(\hat\theta\mid\theta)}=\max_{\hat\theta}\Pi(\hat\theta\mid\theta)\). Condition 2: by the envelope condition \(\Pi'(\theta)=\Pi_2(\hat\theta\mid\theta)|_{\hat\theta=\theta}=-q(\hat\theta)|_{\hat\theta=\theta}=-q(\theta)\), so \(\Pi(\theta)=\Pi(\underline\theta)+\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta\Pi'(\theta)\,d\theta=\Pi(\underline\theta)-\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta q(\theta)\,d\theta\). Condition 1: by the first-order condition \(\Pi_1(\hat\theta\mid\theta)|_{\hat\theta=\theta}=0\) and the local second-order condition \(\Pi_{11}(\hat\theta\mid\theta)|_{\hat\theta=\theta}\le0\), totally differentiating \(\Pi_1=0\) gives \(\underbrace{\Pi_{11}(\theta\mid\theta)}_{\le0}d\theta+\Pi_{12}(\theta\mid\theta)\,d\theta=0\Rightarrow\Pi_{12}(\theta\mid\theta)\ge0\); and \(\Pi_{12}(\theta\mid\theta)=\Pi_{21}(\theta\mid\theta)=-q'(\theta)\ge0\Leftrightarrow q'(\theta)\le0\), which proves it. Conditions 1, 2 are also sufficient (same as §20.4.3). \(\blacksquare\)

21.2.2 步骤 2 / Step 2

用 \(\Pi(\theta)=\Pi(\underline\theta)-\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta q(s)\,ds\) 化简 \(\mathbb{E}_\theta[\Pi(\theta)]\),得 (21.1):

21.2.2 Step 2

Simplify \(\mathbb{E}_\theta[\Pi(\theta)]\) using \(\Pi(\theta)=\Pi(\underline\theta)-\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta q(s)\,ds\) to obtain (21.1):

$$ \mathbb{E}_\theta[\Pi(\theta)]=\Pi(\overline\theta)+\mathbb{E}_\theta\!\left[q(\theta)\frac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)}\right] \tag{21.1} $$

Note

(21.1) 的推导(分部积分)/ Derivation of (21.1) (integration by parts) 先用 \(\Pi(\underline\theta)-\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta q\,ds=\Pi(\overline\theta)+\int_\theta^{\overline\theta}q(s)\,ds\) 改写,再分部积分(取常数使 \(F(\underline\theta)+K=0\)):First rewrite \(\Pi(\underline\theta)-\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta q\,ds=\Pi(\overline\theta)+\int_\theta^{\overline\theta}q(s)\,ds\), then integrate by parts (choosing a constant so that \(F(\underline\theta)+K=0\)):

$$ > \begin{aligned} > \mathbb{E}_\theta[\Pi(\theta)]&=\Pi(\overline\theta)+\int_{\underline\theta}^{\overline\theta}\left(\int_\theta^{\overline\theta}q(s)\,ds\right)f(\theta)\,d\theta\\[2pt] > &=\Pi(\overline\theta)+\int_{\underline\theta}^{\overline\theta}q(\theta)F(\theta)\,d\theta\\[2pt] > &=\Pi(\overline\theta)+\int_{\underline\theta}^{\overline\theta}q(\theta)\frac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)}f(\theta)\,d\theta=\Pi(\overline\theta)+\mathbb{E}_\theta\!\left[q(\theta)\frac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)}\right] > \end{aligned} > $$

21.2.3 步骤 3 / Step 3

由 \(\Pi(\theta)=R(q(\theta))-\theta q(\theta)-K+t(\theta)\) 得 \(t(\theta)=\Pi(\theta)-R(q(\theta))+\theta q(\theta)+K\)。政府目标函数为 (21.2):

21.2.3 Step 3

From \(\Pi(\theta)=R(q(\theta))-\theta q(\theta)-K+t(\theta)\) we get \(t(\theta)=\Pi(\theta)-R(q(\theta))+\theta q(\theta)+K\). The government's objective is (21.2):

$$ \max_{\{q(\cdot),t(\cdot)\}}\mathbb{E}_\theta[CS(q(\theta))-t(\theta)]\Leftrightarrow\max_{\{q(\cdot),\Pi(\cdot)\}}\mathbb{E}_\theta[CS(q(\theta))-\Pi(\theta)+R(q(\theta))-\theta q(\theta)-K] \tag{21.2} $$

代入 (21.1) 的 \(\mathbb{E}_\theta[\Pi(\theta)]\),得目标 \(\max_{\{q(\cdot)\}}\mathbb{E}_\theta[CS(q(\theta))-\Pi(\overline\theta)-q(\theta)(\theta+\frac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)})+R(q(\theta))-K]\),受 \(q'(\cdot)\le0\) 约束。定义 \(\Lambda(q,\theta)=CS(q)-\Pi(\overline\theta)-q(\theta+\frac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)})+R(q)-K\)。因 \(CS''<0\)、\(R''<0\),\(\Lambda\) 关于 \(q\) 凹,f.o.c. 充分,即 \(\Lambda_q(q,\theta)=0\) (21.3)。

Incorporate \(\mathbb{E}_\theta[\Pi(\theta)]\) from (21.1) to get the objective \(\max_{\{q(\cdot)\}}\mathbb{E}_\theta[CS(q(\theta))-\Pi(\overline\theta)-q(\theta)(\theta+\frac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)})+R(q(\theta))-K]\), subject to \(q'(\cdot)\le0\). Define \(\Lambda(q,\theta)=CS(q)-\Pi(\overline\theta)-q(\theta+\frac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)})+R(q)-K\). Since \(CS''<0\), \(R''<0\), \(\Lambda\) is concave in \(q\) and the f.o.c. is sufficient, i.e. \(\Lambda_q(q,\theta)=0\) (21.3).

Tip

保证 \(q'(\cdot)\le0\) / Ensuring \(q'(\cdot)\le0\) 全微分 (21.3):\(\Lambda_{qq}\,dq+\Lambda_{q\theta}\,d\theta=0\Rightarrow q'(\theta)=-\dfrac{\Lambda_{q\theta}(q,\theta)}{\Lambda_{qq}(q,\theta)}\le0\)。故 \(q'(\cdot)\le0\) 等价于 \(\Lambda_{q\theta}(q,\theta)\le0\),由施加 \(\dfrac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)}\) 关于 \(\theta\) 递增(充分非必要)保证。结论:施加 \(\dfrac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)}\) 递增,则 \(\Lambda_q=0\) 的点态解给出满足 \(q'(\theta)\le0\) 的最优 \(q(\theta)\)。Totally differentiate (21.3): \(\Lambda_{qq}\,dq+\Lambda_{q\theta}\,d\theta=0\Rightarrow q'(\theta)=-\dfrac{\Lambda_{q\theta}(q,\theta)}{\Lambda_{qq}(q,\theta)}\le0\). So \(q'(\cdot)\le0\) is equivalent to \(\Lambda_{q\theta}(q,\theta)\le0\), guaranteed by imposing \(\dfrac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)}\) increasing in \(\theta\) (sufficient but not necessary). In conclusion, imposing \(\dfrac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)}\) increasing, the point-wise solution to \(\Lambda_q=0\) gives the optimal \(q(\theta)\) with \(q'(\theta)\le0\).

21.2.4 步骤 4 / Step 4

由 \(q(\cdot)\) 恢复 \(\Pi(\cdot)\) 与 \(t(\cdot)\):

21.2.4 Step 4

Recover \(\Pi(\cdot)\) and \(t(\cdot)\) from \(q(\cdot)\):

$$ \Pi(\theta)=\underbrace{\Pi(\underline\theta)}_{=0\text{ by IR}}-\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta q(s)\,ds,\qquad t(\theta)=\Pi(\theta)-R(q(\theta))+\theta q(\theta)+K $$

Important

21.2.5 步骤 5:价格菜单 / Step 5: price menu 找实施直接机制 \(\{q(\theta),\Pi(\theta)\}_{\theta\in\Theta}\) 的 \(P(q)\)。(a) \(P(q)\) 为买 \(q\) 的总价:\(P(q)=\{t(\theta)+R(q(\theta))\text{ if }q=q(\theta)\text{ for any }\theta;\ \infty\text{ otherwise}\}\)。(b) 用 \(q(\cdot)\) 之逆写 \(P(q)=t(q^{-1}(q))+R(q)\);因 \(q(\cdot)\) 未必严格单调,定义 \(\overline\theta(q)=\sup_\theta\{\theta:q(\theta)=q\}\),则 \(P(q)=t(\overline\theta(q))+R(q)\) 即所求价格菜单。Find \(P(q)\) implementing the direct mechanism \(\{q(\theta),\Pi(\theta)\}_{\theta\in\Theta}\). (a) \(P(q)\) is the total price paid for \(q\): \(P(q)=\{t(\theta)+R(q(\theta))\text{ if }q=q(\theta)\text{ for any }\theta;\ \infty\text{ otherwise}\}\). (b) Using the inverse of \(q(\cdot)\), \(P(q)=t(q^{-1}(q))+R(q)\); since \(q(\cdot)\) is not necessarily strictly monotone, define \(\overline\theta(q)=\sup_\theta\{\theta:q(\theta)=q\}\), then \(P(q)=t(\overline\theta(q))+R(q)\) is the desired price menu.

参考文献 / References

  • Baron, D. P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982). Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs.(成本未知下的垄断规制)
  • 本章是 [[monopolistic-screening]](Ch 20)确定性五步法的应用。

References

  • Baron, D. P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982). Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs. (regulating a monopolist under unknown costs)
  • This chapter applies the deterministic 5-step method of [[monopolistic-screening]] (Ch 20).